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TAX AVOIDANCE BY CITIZENS OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION: WILL THE DRAFT
TAX CODE PROVIDE A SOLUTION?*
I. TRODUCTION
Taxes imposed in the Russian Federation run the gamut from
the sublime to the ridiculous, with the use of the word "Russia" or
"Russia Federation" in business names,1 pet dog ownership,2 and the
resale of automobiles and personal computers3 subject to taxation.
With such taxes being levied, it is not surprising that during the first
eleven months of 1996, only 70% of the projected tax revenue was
actually collected,4 and that this tax shortfall deprived the Russian
government of as much as $100 billion.' During the first nine months
of 1997, tax collection statistics did not improve; tax receipts
*The author wishes to thank Professor Richard L. Schmalbeck of Duke University School of
Law for his guidance and assistance in the preparation of this Note. The following examination
of the Russian tax situation and the draft tax code is current as of January 1998. However, as
with any piece of draft legislation, the specific provisions of the draft tax code cited herein are
subject to ongoing revision, which may render inapplicable some aspects of the following
analysis.
1. See Fundamentals of the RF Tax System Act, RF Act No. 2118-1, RF Supreme Soviet
Decree No. 2119-1 (Dec. 27,1991), art. 19, para. 1(p), translated and available in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, Rflaw File (with additions and amendments through July 21, 1997) [hereinafter
Fundamentals of the RF Tax System]; see also Charge for Use of the Names "Russia, Russia
Federation" and Words and Phrases Formed on Their Basis, RF Act No. 4737-1 (Apr. 2,1993),
translated and available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rusleg File.
2. See Fundamentals of the RF Tax System, supra note 1, art. 21, para. 10).
3. See iL art. 21, para. l(i).
4. See Peter Henderson, Divided Russian Parliament Delays Budget Decision, Reuters
Fin. Serv., Dec. 6,1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reufin File.
5. See Matthew Brzezinski, Fiscal Fight: Russia's Campaign to Stop Tax Evasion Faces
Many Hurdles, WALL ST. J. EuR., Apr. 14, 1997, at 1. During 1996, tax avoidance and evasion
ran rampant; according to a study of Russia's Chief Oversight Administration, of the 2.6
million juristic persons registered with the tax authorities in 1996, 16% committed no serious
violations of the tax laws, while 50% owed some amount of tax in arrears and 34% were not
paying at all. See Elmar Murtazayev, Presidential Staff Brings to Light Ineffectiveness of Tax
System, SEVODNYA, Feb. 5,1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Spd File.
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measured only 52% of targeted amounts.6 The Russian government
proposed a 20% cut to its 1997 budget,7 and ironically has not been
able to pay the salaries of its own tax inspectors.8
Further manifestations of Russia's problems with tax collection
highlight the need for reform. For example, repeated violence
against members of the State Tax Service has contributed to
difficulties with tax collection, and proves that the current regime is
unmanageable: In 1996, twenty-six tax collectors were murdered,
seventy-four were injured, and six were kidnapped while eighteen
Russian tax offices were "shot up."9  Although President Boris
Yeltsin included tax reform as a component of his 1996 election
platform"0 and characterized tax reform as the "key economic task"
of 1997 during a March speech to the Russian Parliament," in the
past he has only compounded the problem by granting tax
exemptions to both business entities and entire regions during his
6. See Stephanie Baker-Said, IMF Loan Safe From Poor Tax Collection, MOSCow
TIMES, Oct. 18,1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File. However, tax collection
figures for 1997 have been erratic; tax revenues during the second quarter of 1997 only fell
short of budgeted targets by 13%. See Donald H. Gold, Investors Like Russia's Move to a Free
Market, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, July 8, 1997, at A17; see also Russia Tax Collection 46
Percent Up, ITAR-TASS, June 5, 1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass
File (reporting that Russia's tax revenues experienced a 46% increase in the first five months
of 1997 compared to the same period in 1996). See Michael Lelyveld, Financier: "Intolerable"
Russian Tax Situation Must Be Dealt With In '98, J. COMMERCE, Jan. 12,1998, at 3A.
7. See Timothy Heritage, Yeltsin Backs Tough Economic Reforms, Reuters N. Am. Wire,
May 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna File; see also Revenue Shortfall
Prompts Proposal for20% Budget Cut, CFH. TRIB., May 6,1997, at 10.
8. See Richard C. Paddock, Tax Hell in Russia is Really Hell; Americans Still Reeling
From April 15 Can Take Comfort in the Plight of the Kremlin's Subjects, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1997, at Al. Wages for some tax inspectors have not been paid since September of 1996. State
Tax Service Chief on Plans to Reform (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 3, 1997),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Bbcswb File.
9. Al Caponeskis, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at 15. During the first six months of 1997,
ten members of the tax police were killed, forty were injured and two were reported missing.
See Yelena Ivanova, 10 Tax Police Officers Kille, 40 Injured Over Jan-Jun 1997, ITAR-TASs,
Aug. 23, 1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File. In addition, many
tax offices are lacking in functional necessities such as electricity or telephone service.
Paddock, supra note 8, at Al. One tax inspector was even bitten by a man owing taxes in
arrears. See Sujata Rao, Tax Police Sing Their Own Praises, MOSCOW TIMES, Dec. 11, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
10. See Text of Yeltsin's Election Programme (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June
13,1996), translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Bbcswb File.
11. See David Hoffman, Yeltsin Vows to Restore Order; Pledges Government Shakeup:
Thinner After Illness, Leader Speaks Firmly, WASH. POST, Mar. 7,1997, at Al.
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1996 election campaign.' 2
Russia's problems with tax collection are also affecting its ability
to obtain much-needed foreign aid. In 1996, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) twice delayed payments on a three-year, $10
billion loan to Russia because of its acute problems with tax
collection. The IMF again froze loan tranches to Russia in early
1997 and only released a $700 million payment in May after an IMF
Managing Director personally appraised Russia's financial situation
and Russia agreed to, inter alia, tax reform and improved tax
collection. 4 Citing a continuing decline in tax collection, the IMF
once again delayed Russia's final $700 million installment for 1997'5
until yet another agreement was reached on tax reform and improved
tax collection." In addition, several Group of Seven (G7) ministers
have publicly expressed concern over Russia's inability to collect
taxes." The World Bank, when extending a $884 million loan to
12. See David Filipov, As Crises Ebb, It's Time to Get Down to Business, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 5,1997, at D5.
13. See Janet Guttsman, Focus-Duma May Vote on Budget for Jan-March 1997, Reuters
Fin. Serv., Dec. 3,1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reufin File.
14. See Stephanie Baker-Said, IMF Says No Loan Without Tax Code, MoScow TIMES,
Apr. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostrns File; IMF Experts to Come to Moscow
on July 22, ITAR-TASS, July 15, 1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass
File. The IMF also sent a delegation to monitor the Russian economy before deciding whether
to release a $700 million payment due in September 1997. See Pavel Kuzetsov, Release of IMF
Credit Tranche for Moscow to be Recommended, ITAR-TASS, Aug. 1, 1997, translated and
available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File.
15. See Stephanie Baker-Said, IMF Casts Doubt Over Loan Release, Moscow TIMES,
Dec. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File; David Hoffman, IMF Suspends
Loan to Russia, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1997, at A18; Konstantin Levin, The IMF Forgives
Russia, KOMMERS., Nov. 11, 1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Sbe File.
Another IMF delegation will spend the first two weeks of December in Moscow assessing the
state of promised economic reforms. See Andrei Shitov, Another IMF Team to Work in
Moscow for Fortnight, ITAR-TASS, Nov. 27, 1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News
Library, Tass File.
16. The agreement between the Russian government and the IMF was reached in
December 1997 and the loan tranche was released in January 1998. See Michael R. Gordon,
Russia Reaches LM.F. Accord to Free Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1997, at Al; Ivan Lebedev,
IMF Unlocks Extended Facility Tranche for Russia, ITAR-TASS, Jan. 9, 1998, translated and
available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File.
17. For example, after a regular meeting held in April 1997, G7 ministers publicly stated
that Russia must address its inability to collect taxes, see Janet Guttsman, G7 Welcomes
Russian Reforms, Seeks Tough Tax Rules, REUTER EUR. Bus. REP., Apr. 27, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Reueub File, and then reiterated this message after the Denver Summit
held in June 1997. See Denver Summit Economic Statement Supports Russia's Course, ITAR-
TASs, June 22, 1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File. Likewise,
after a September 1997 meeting, G7 ministers, in assessing Russia's recent economic
19971
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Russia in June 1997, placed tax administration and collection at the
top of the list of necessary reforms facing the Russian government."
However, signs of improvement have recently appeared.
Alexander Pochinok, the head of the Russian State Tax Service, has
made increased tax collection a priority19 and is currently overseeing
a crackdown on the most flagrant tax-evading enterprisesY2 Newly-
appointed Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov has informed Finance
Ministry staff that implementation of a new tax regime will be a
primary task for 1998.21
performance, again highlighted the need for improvement in tax collection. See G7 Ministers
Generally Satisfied with Russian Performance, Agence France Presse, Sep. 20, 1997, translated
and available in LEXIS, News Library, Afp File.
18. See World Bank Announces 884 Million Dollars in Loans to Russia, Agence France
Presse, June 6, 1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Alp File.; see also
Alexander Mineyev, World Bank May Extend Three Loans to Russia, ITAR-TASS, Nov. 18,
1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File (linking approval of three new
loans to improvement in tax collection).
19. See Natalya Varnavskaya and Sergei Kochetov, New Head of the Tax Service: lAm No
Longer That Lop-eared Fellow, KOMMERS., Apr. 17, 1997, at 1. For example, Pochinok
promised that he would fire the head of the tax inspectorate that collected the least amount of
revenue in June. See Russia's Tax Chief Promises to Fire Worst Collector, ITAR-TASS, June 20,
1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File. Pochinok has also gone so
far as to publish his e-mail address and solicit public comments on the current tax system, tax
reform and the draft code. See Russian Tax Service Head Gives Out E-Mail Address, Rus. &
COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. RuP., June 4,1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rcblr File.
20. See Press Conference with State Tax Service Head Alexander Pochinok (Official
Kremlin International News Broadcast, July 25, 1997), translated and available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File; see also Chrystia Freeland, Kremlin Victory on Company Tax Arrears,
FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1997, at 24 (reporting that the campaign to collect unpaid taxes involves
companies whose tax debt in total represents 60% of all taxes in arrears). This campaign has
met with some success; RAO Norilsk Nickel recently transferred a 50% equity stake to the
Russian government to hold in trust against its $88.7 million tax debt, and Gazprom paid its
entire tax debt of approximately 14.5 trillion rubles ($2.52 billion) by the end of June. See
Matthew Brzezinski, Russia Concedes its Finances Are a Mess, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1997, at
A14; Richard L. Holman, World Wire-Postscripts ... , WALL ST. J., June 26, 1997, at A14. The
Russian government recently has announced a renewed campaign against other tax-evading
enterprises, a sign that the government is seriously striving to improve tax collection. See
Stephanie Baker-Said, State to Crack Down on Big Tax Debtors, MoScOW TIMES, Nov. 12,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File; New List of Bad Debtors to Government
Coming on January 22, ITAR-TASS, Jan. 9, 1998, translated and available in LEXIS, News
Library, Tass File. For example, the government plans to seize key oil refineries of two
Russian oil companies, Sibneft and Sidanko, who owe 526 billion and 766 billion rubles,
respectively, in back taxes. See Jeanne Whalen, Sibneft to Fight Oil Refinery Seizure, MOSCOW
Tavms, Dec. 10,1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
21. See Itar-Tass Economic News Digest of November 21, ITAR-TASS, Nov. 21, 1997,
translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File; see also Press Conference with State
Tax Service Head Alexander Pochinok (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, Nov.
21,1997), translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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Most importantly, in recognition of the abysmal level of tax
collection and the need for reform, the Russian government
submitted a four-part draft tax code to the Duma, the lower house of
the Russian parliament, on April 30, 1997.2 By a vote of 244 to 84
with 2 abstentions, the Duma approved the draft code upon its first
reading on June 19, 1997. '3 However, on November 19, 1997,
following a series of political maneuverss and an onslaught of
amendments,' the Duma voted to abrogate its June approval of the
draft tax code, in essence sending the draft code back to the
beginning of the legislative process.' Although the original draft
22. See Russia PM Chernomyrdin Sends Tax Code to Duma, Reuters Fin. Serv., Apr. 30,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reufin File. The first part of the draft tax code was
submitted to the Duma in 1996; the remaining three parts of the draft code were submitted on
April 30, 1997. See id.
23. See Russia Duma Passes Tax Code in First Reading, ITAR-TASS, June 19, 1997,
translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File. Under the Russian legislative
system, draft legislation goes through two readings in the Duma where amendments are
proposed and revisions are made. A required third reading and vote represents formal
approval by the Duma. See Christian Lowe, Duma Bows to Kremlin Pressure on Tax Code,
MOSCOw TIMEs, June 20, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostins File. After the
Duma formally approves the draft code, the upper house of the Russian Parliament considers
the draft and then, if approved, passes it on to President Yeltsin for signature. See The
Constitution of the Russian Federation (Dec. 12, 1993), art 105-107, translated and reprinted in
RUSSIA & THE REPUBLCS--LEGAL MATERALS (John N. Hazard & Vratislav Pechota eds.,
1997). This document is also available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rflaw File.
24. On October 21, 1997, Yeltsin offered to withdraw the draft code to appease
Communist members of the Duma who were threatening to oust Yeltsin's Cabinet through a
no-confidence vote. See David Hoffman, Moscow Compromise Complicates Tax Tangle; To
Placate Communist Legislators, Yeltsin Retreats on Revenue Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1997, at
A28; Dmitry Zaks, Yeltsin Gave As Good As He Got, Moscow TIMs, Oct. 23, 1997, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File. However, a compromise solution was reached: a
"trilateral" or "conciliatory" commission composed of representatives from both houses of the
Russian Parliament was given the task of amending the original draft code and submitting the
revised version for a second reading. See Stephanie Baker-Said, Analysts Back Kremlin on Tax
Bill, Moscow TIMEs, Oct 23, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File; John
Thornhill, Russian Reformers Optimistic About Tax, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24,1997, at 2.
25. As of November 1, 1997, over 5000 amendments to the draft tax code have been
submitted. See Igor Zhukov, 5000 Amendments to Tax Code Submitted As of Now-Seleznyov,
ITAR-TASS, Nov. 1,1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File.
26. See Ivan Novikov, Duma Rejects Government's Tax Code, Calls for Alternative Drafts,
ITAR-TASS, Nov. 19, 1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File. A
"compromise version" of the draft code will be generated by a special commission of
representatives from both houses of Parliament and from the government and resubmitted to
the Duma for a first reading in early February 1998. See Robert Serebrennikov, Tax Code
Draft Not to Be Submitted to Duma Until February 1, ITAR-TASS, Nov. 21, 1997, translated and
available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File. The original draft code has not been rejected
outright but is being considered as one of the alternatives for future reform. See id. (quoting
1997]
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code submitted to the Duma in June will not be the exact version
ultimately adopted' 7 this draft will provide a foundation for
meaningful tax reform in Russia's near future.
This Note discusses personal income tax avoidance by citizens of
the Russian Federation and analyzes whether the draft tax code will
alleviate this situation. Section II outlines personal income taxation
both during the Tsarist regimes of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and during the Soviet Era. Section III provides a
background on personal income taxation under the current tax
regime of the Russian Federation. Section IV examines various
methods of income tax avoidance currently used by citizens of the
Russian Federation and suggests several explanations for the use of
these practices. Section V analyzes whether the draft tax code will
correct the flaws in the current tax regime and perhaps halt the
widespread avoidance of personal income tax obligations. Section VI
offers several conclusions about the future of the draft tax code and
the Russian tax regime.
II. HISTORY OF THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX IN TSARIST
RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION
A. Taxation During the Tsarist Regimes of the Late Nineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries
Under the tsarist regimes of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the peasantry, which constituted about three
quarters of Russia's total population at the turn of the century,s bore
much of the burden of, but had no experience with, a personal
Vladimir Ryzhkov, Duma First Deputy Speaker).
27. According to the Head of the State Tax Service, Alexander Pochinok, the most
feasible alternative draft being considered is quite similar to the original draft which was
presented to the Duma in June 1997:
The [] draft, also known as the "Pokhmelkin draft" is an adapted version of the first
part of the government's draft. So,... the most logical course of action for the
government is to resubmit the text it already submitted to the Duma with the changes
agreed during the work of the four working groups of the Duma and the government
last summer and autumn. So, in effect, it is the same draft law.
Press Conference with Stanislav Gomulko, Russian-European Center for Economic
Policy Expert, and Vladimir Mau, RF Government's Working Center for Economic
Reform Head (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, Dec. 15, 1997),
translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
28. See NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY, A HISTORY OF RussiA 430 (5th ed. 1993)
(population figure taken from the census of 1897).
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income tax.' The peasantry was subject to two direct taxes, neither
of which was tied to income. The first, a flat tax known as the "head
tax," was technically repealed by Tsar Alexander II in 1886, but
continued to be paid by some of the peasantry until 1907. The
second, a special tax of "redemption payments," largely was
abolished in 1905.0 Over time, the tax burden on the peasantry
shifted from direct to indirect taxation, with excise taxes, typically
imposed on essential items rather than luxury goods,31 representing
over 75% of all government revenues by 1913.2 Although several
proposals to introduce a personal income tax were made beginning in
1892, a final bill imposing a general income tax was not approved by
Tsar Nicholas II until April 1916, and was not rendered effective until
early 1917.3' Thus, on the eve of the Russian Revolution in 1917, a
personal income tax did exist, but Russian citizens had virtually no
experience complying with its provisions.
B. Taxation During the Soviet Era'
The Soviet framework of a personal income tax was established
in the early 1940s and existed in slightly-revised forms until the
demise of the Soviet Union. In 1943, the personal income tax was
modified by a decree entitled "On the Income Tax on the
Population."'35 Minor changes to the 1943 decree were made
periodically from the 1940s through the early 1980S, 36 and in 1983,
these changes were incorporated into legislation which amended the
29. See MICHAEL A. NEWCITY, TAXATION IN TIiE SOVIET UNION 2-5 (1986);
RIASANOVSKY, supra note 28, at 431-32.
30. See NEwCrrY, supra note 29, at 2-3; RASANOVSKY, supra note 28, at 432.
Redemption payments were collected by the Russian government as repayment for the
compensation paid to serf owners following the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. See
NEWCITY, supra note 29, at 2.
31. These excise taxes affected everyday items such as sugar, tea, cotton and vodka. See
RIASANOVSKY, supra note 28, at 432.
32. See NEwcrrY, supra note 29, at 3; RiASANOVSKY, supra note 28, at 432.
33. See NEWCrTY, supra note 29, at 4.
34. For the sake of simplicity, the history of the taxation of individuals during the Soviet
Era will be limited to the basic system which was in place from the mid-1940s until the fall of
the Soviet Union and will omit the various tax regimes associated with War Communism, the
New Economic Policy, and Stalin's pre-World War II Five-Year Plans. For a general overview
of taxation in the Soviet Union, see id.
35. See id at 73-75.
36. See id. at 26-27.
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original 1943 decree.' Because only slight modifications were made
to the Russian tax system between the 1940s and the early 1980s, the
system created by the 1943 decree is largely reflected in the 1983
legislation. Thus, the 1983 provisions' will be cited to as the relevant
tax law during the Soviet Era.
Similar to the citizens of the Tsarist regimes, the citizens of the
Soviet Era also gained little experience complying with a personal
income tax. Under the Soviet tax regime, the personal income tax
was not a principal source of revenue for the government. For
example, in 1983, "state taxes on the population"39 comprised only
7.7% of all Soviet state revenues, while the tax burden imposed on
enterprises' comprised approximately 65.6% of those revenues.
4
'
Correspondingly, Soviet citizens faced a relatively minimal tax
burden: "By 1983, 8.7% of personal income was being spent on taxes,
duties and other government payments."'4  Nevertheless, Soviet
citizens were subject to three significant direct taxes at the state level:
(1) the income tax on the population; (2) the tax on bachelors, single
citizens, and citizens with small families; and (3) the agricultural tax.43
1. The Income Tax on the Population. The income tax on the
population represented the most comprehensive of the direct taxes
imposed on Soviet citizens. This tax was levied on four different
sources of income: (1) income received by factory and office workers
at their primary place of work; (2) income earned by individuals at
workplaces other than their primary place of work;45 (3) royalties
37. See id. at 74-75.
38. See id.
39. States taxes on the population reflect the income tax on the population, the bachelor's
tax, and the agricultural tax. See id. at 74-75.
40. The taxation of enterprises was accomplished through numerous direct taxes, including
the turnover tax, several profit taxes, the income tax on collective farms, the income tax on
cooperatives, and state social insurance contributions. See id. at 48-72 (describing the taxation
of enterprises in the Soviet Union).
41. See id at 38.
42. Id. at 74 (citation omitted).
43. See id. at 73. The Soviet state also imposed two other direct taxes on individuals: local
taxes and state duties. See id. Local taxes specifically levied by the Soviet state included the
tax'on the owners of buildings, a land tax, and a tax on the owners of means of transportation.
See id at 131-56. State duties were imposed on nine different types of services that the Soviet
government provided to its citizens, including court proceedings, arbitration proceedings and
foreign travel. See id. at 156-68.
44. See id. at 86-89; see also infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
45. See NEWcrrY, supra note 29, at 89-92; see also infra notes 50-52 and accompanying
[Vol. 8:135
TAX AVOIDANCE IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
obtained from works of art, literature and scientific scholarship; and
(4) income generated from private activities, such as private trade in
handicraft or artisan objects and private professional practice.' The
income of factory and office workers earned at their primary
workplace was subject to the lowest rate of taxation,4 and the
payment of tax owed on this income was not the responsibility of
individual taxpayers: "the amount of tax due [was] calculated by the
enterprise in which the taxpayer work[ed] and that amount [was]
withheld from the taxpayer's wages."49 Smaller amounts of income"
earned by individuals at their secondary places of employment were
subject to a higher marginal rate51 and again the resulting tax
obligation of individual taxpayers was settled by the employer-
enterprise. 2 Only those individuals who received income from
private activities, such as private professional practice or sales of
handicraft work, were responsible for preparing and filing an income
tax return with the tax authorities.53 On a return submitted by
January 15, these individuals estimated their income for the current
year based on the previous year's earnings.' The taxpayers were
then responsible for remitting the tax due in four equal installments
on March 15, May 15, August 15, and November 15.'
The Soviet system did provide individuals with several tax
exemptions. For example, factory and office workers did not pay
income tax on a set minimum amount earned at their primary
workplace. 6 In addition, tax exemptions were available for certain
text.
46. See NEWCrTY, supra note 29, at 92-99. Those individuals receiving income from works
of art, literature or scientific scholarship were subject to three different tax schedules: one for
royalties received domestically, one for royalties received abroad, and one for royalties
received by the heirs of those producing the works. See id.
47. See id. at 99-104; see also infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
48. In 1983, marginal rates on income in this category ranged from .35% to 13%. See
NEWCITY, supra note 29, at 86.
49. ld. at 89.
50. Ninety or fewer rubles per month. See id. at 91.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 92.
53. See id. at 102.
54. See id. at 103-04.
55. See id. at 104.
56. See id. at 77-78. In 1983, the tax-free minimum amount was 70 rubles per month and
the average monthly wage was 182 rubles per month, resulting in 112 rubles of taxable income.
See id. A tax exemption for minimum amounts of income also applied to income earned from
the private sale of handicraft or artisan objects and from private professional practice. See id
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military personnel, invalids, and pensioners.' The Soviet tax regime
also excluded from taxation several categories of income, including
alimony, state-paid benefits such as social insurance and social
security, amounts received through inheritance or gift except certain
royalties, and interest received from state savings banks.'
2. Bachelors' Tax. Soviet citizens also obtained some
experience with direct taxation of personal income through payment
of the "bachelors' tax." Established in 1941, the bachelors' tax was
imposed on the earnings of all childless men between the ages of
twenty and fifty, whether or not they were married, and on the
earnings of all childless and married women between the ages of
twenty and forty-five .59 Beginning in 1972, factory and office workers
subject to the bachelor's tax were taxed at rates falling between .28%
and 6.0% depending on their level of income,' while writers, artists,
and workers holding second jobs, also subject to the bachelors' tax,
faced a flat tax rate of 6%.61 Like the income tax, most Soviet citizens
were not personally responsible for calculating and remitting tax
owed to the finance authorities.' Instead, their employer-enterprises
would ensure that the appropriate amount of tax was deducted from
monthly wages.6
3. Agricultural Tax. The agricultural tax imposed during the
Soviet Era took the form, at different points in time, of both in-kind
taxes and direct monetary payments. 4 Imposed at the household and
not the individual level, this tax affected two major groups of Soviet
citizens: those who were members of collective farms and those who
at 78.
57. See id. at 80-81.
58. See id. at 82-85.
59. See id. at 107-09. Between 1944 and 1958, the bachelors' tax was expanded to
encompass a broader group of Soviet citizens: childless but unmarried men and women, phis
families with less than three children. See id. at 107-08.
60. See id. at 110-11. Individuals earning less than a tax-free minimum amount (which was
set at the same level as for payment of the income tax on individuals) were not subject to the
bachelors' tax. In addition, several individuals and forms of income enjoyed exemption from
the tax. See id. at 110.
61. See id. at 112.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 112.
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cultivated private parcels of land in rural areas.' The agricultural tax
was imposed on the land itself and not the income produced from the
land. Therefore, the rate of taxation was based on both the size and
geographic location of the parcel, with different tax rates imposed by
each union republic.6 The Soviet households subject to the
agricultural tax did not personally calculate the amount of tax due,
but instead remitted, in two equal installments, an amount prescribed
by the finance authorities.6
Thus, during the Soviet Era, citizens were subject to three
comprehensive direct taxes on income or income-producing
activities. However, most urban area employees were not required to
affirmatively comply with the Soviet tax regime and instead relied on
the enterprise for which they worked to calculate and remit any tax
owed. Likewise, those engaged in agricultural production in rural
areas of the Soviet Union were entitled to rely on the tax calculations
of the local finance authority and merely were required to make the
appropriate payments as they came due.
III. PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION UNDER THE
CURRENT TAX REGIME OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
A. Substance and Administration of the Current Regimes
In March 1991, the Supreme Soviet created a state agency, the
RSFSR State Tax Service, to replace the State Revenue Service of
the USSR and to administer a new tax regime.69 The powers of the
State Tax Service were further defined by Russian President Boris
Yeltsin in a decree issued in the fall of 1991.70 This decree charged
65. See id at 113. Individuals living in urban areas who cultivated private parcels of land
were not subject to the agricultural tax. See id.
66. See id at 116. In addition, until 1983 farmers engaged solely in private farming were
subject to tax rates which were 75 to 100% higher than those imposed on their collective farm
counterparts. See id at 117.
67. See id at 117.
68. This section provides an overview of the taxation of income earned by individuals at
places of employment and does not furnish information about the taxation of other sources of
personal income such as that received from property or business investments.
69. See RSFSR State Tax Service Act (Mar. 21, 1991), translated and reprinted in 2
BusINEss AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RuSSIA § 4.10 (John P. Hupp ed., 1995); see also
Christopher Osakwe, Navigating the Minefields of Russian Joint Venture Law and Tax
Regulations: A Procedural Compass, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL.799, 855-856 n.148 (1993).
70. RF State Tax Service, RF President's Edict No. 340 (Oct. 31, 1991), translated and
reprinted in 2 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RussiA § 4.11 (John P. Hupp ed., 1995).
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the State Tax Service with the task of ensuring "compliance with tax
legislation, correct assessment of taxes, complete and timely entry
into the respective budgets, of state taxes and other payments
prescribed by the legislation of the Russia Federation and the
republics within it... ,71 The general framework of the current tax
regime in Russia was passed into law by the Supreme Soviet in
December 1991.' This legislation divided the taxes to be levied in
the Russian Federation into three levels (e.g., federal,
republic/regional, and local)' and described the type of taxes that
could be imposed and collected at each level by the appropriate
government body.74 Another legislative act of the Supreme Soviet
passed at this time, entitled "On Income Tax of Natural Persons,"
has provided more specific guidance on the taxation of individuals.'
The Income Tax on Natural Persons Act places a duty both on
all "taxable natural persons" to register all earned income and pay
the appropriate tax due and on all enterprises and organizations to
deduct from, and pay the appropriate tax due for, the incomes of
their employees. 6 In doing so, the Income Tax on Natural Persons
Act differentiates, inter alia, between income earned at the primary
workplace and income earned at additional places of employment.'
At individuals' primary workplaces, employer-enterprises should
automatically calculate and then deduct tax due from earned
income.' However, individuals earning income from more than one
This document is also available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rusleg File.
71. Id. art. 6.
72. See generally Fundamentals of the RF Tax System, supra note 1.
73. See id. art. 18, para. 1.
74. Id. art. 19 (federal taxes); id. art. 20 (taxes of republics and regions); id. art. 21 (local
taxes).
75. RF Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, RF Act No. 1998-1, RF Supreme Soviet
Enacting Decree No. 1999-1 (Dec. 7, 1991), translated and available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
Rusleg File (with amendments and addenda as of June 21, 1996) [hereinafter Income Tax on
Natural Persons Act].
76. Id. art. 20.
77. See Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, supra note 75. The Income Tax on Natural
Persons Act also contains provisions addressing the taxation of income from business and other
income, the taxation of foreign citizens and persons without citizenship having permanent
residence in the Russian Federation, and the taxation of persons without permanent place of
residence in the Russian Federation. Id.
78. See id. art. 7-9. Article 9 provides that "[e]nterprises, institutions and organizations
shall be obliged to transfer to the budget amounts of tax calculated and deducted from natural
persons on day of actual receipt of cash from their bank for renumeration of labor," thereby
placing the burden on employers to remit any tax owed to the appropriate tax agency.
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place of employment must submit an income declaration delineating
"all income gained during the year, sources of their receipt and the
sum of taxes calculated and paid"7 9 to the local tax agency serving
their primary residence.80 Current government estimates suggest that
employer-enterprises are obligated to remit the appropriate tax owed
by their employees for seventy-five of the eighty million Russian
citizens who are required to pay tax on earned income."1 Tax officials
have also estimated that approximately 3.3 million Russian citizens
filed income tax declarations this year."
The Income Tax on Natural Persons Act also allows the amount
of tax due to be reduced by numerous exemptions. While several of
these exemptions are available to all taxpayers," many are based on
either the nature of the income earned or the status of the
taxpayer.' Once taxable income has been calculated, Russian
citizens face a top marginal rate of 35%," but most Russians fall
within the lowest of five tax brackets and pay only a marginal rate of
12%.87
Pursuant to an amendment to the Income Tax on Natural Persons Act effective January 1,
1998, employers must submit an annual report to the tax authorities of the income paid to each
employee at its primary place of business no later than March 1 of the following year. See
Amendments and Addenda to the RF Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, RF Federal Act
No. 94-FZ (June 28, 1997), translated and available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rusleg File
[hereinafter RF Federal Act No. 94-FZ].
79. Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, supra note 75, art. 18, para. 2; see also Andrei
Zolotov, April 1 No Joke for Some Taxpayers, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 1, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
80. See Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, supra note 75, art. 18, para. 1. The income
declaration must be submitted by April I of the year subsequent to the one for which income is
being reported. Id. As of January 1, 1998, employers do have an obligation, every three
months, to submit a report of the address of and income paid to each individual outside its
primary place of business. See RF Federal Act No. 94-FZ, supra note 77.
81. See KOMMERS., Mar. 7,1997, at 6.
82. See Gennady Yezhov, Russia to Simplify Tax Payment Procedure, ITAR-TASS, July 8,
1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File.
83. These exemptions include a deduction for charitable contributions and a deduction for
"maintenance of children and dependents." Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, supra note 75,
art. 3, para. 6.
84. See generally Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, supra note 75, art. 3, para. 1.
85. See id. paras. 2-3.
86. See id. art. 6 (setting forth marginal tax rates imposed on differing levels of taxable
income). This tax rate applies to incomes greater than $8,400 per year. See Paddock, supra
note 8, at Al.
87. See Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, supra note 75, art. 6. This tax rate applies to
incomes up to $2,100 per year. See Paddock, supra note 8, at Al.
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B. Enforcement Under the Current Tax Regime
In early 1992, the Tax Inspectorate of the Russian Federation,
commonly known as the tax police, was created to manage the
enforcement of the new tax regime.s With the passage of the Federal
Fiscal Police Act in June 1993, the Tax Inspectorate was removed
from the supervision of the State Tax Service and became an
independent enforcement agencyY In December 1995, in an effort to
improve poor tax collection, new legislation transformed the Tax
Inspectorate into a national agency and conferred upon it the
authority to launch preliminary criminal investigations of suspected
tax evaders, and to perform comprehensive audits and impose
penalties based on audit findings.'
Under current tax legislation, penalties for the violation of the
tax laws include various fines and surcharges.91 In addition, the
Russian Federation Criminal Code, which became effective on
January 1, 1997, strengthens legal enforcement of tax legislation by
providing that the intentional violation of such legislation is a
criminal offense, carrying the penalty of imprisonment up to three
years." President Boris Yeltsin has recently enhanced the
enforcement of tax laws by signing a decree outlawing tax
concessions not supported by some provision of existing tax
legislation.'
The Russian government has recently undertaken several
88. See KOMMERS., Feb. 10-17, 1992, at 25.
89. See Federal Fiscal Police Act, RF Act No. 5238-1; RF Supreme Soviet Decree No.
4990-1 and Decree No. 5239-1 (June 24, 1993), translated and reprinted in 2 BUsINESS AND
COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA § 4.12.5 (John P. Hupp ed., 1995). This document is also
available in LEXIS, News Library, Rusleg File.
90. See Amendments and Addenda to the RF Federal Fiscal Police Act and the RSFSR
Code of Criminal Procedure, RF Federal Act No. 200-FZ (Nov. 15, 1995), translated and
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rusleg File; see also Russian Tax Police Gain New Powers
Under Revised Law, Russ. & COMMONWEALTH BUS. L. REP., Feb. 12, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Rcblr File.
91. See Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, supra note 75, art. 22; see also Fundamentals
of the RF Tax System, supra note 1, art. 13, para. 1. These include a 100% surcharge for
understating income. See Ride a High Tax Horse, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1996, at A6.
92. See Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, RF Act No. 63-FZ (June 13, 1996), art.
198 (Tax Evasion by an Individual), translated and available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rflaw
File; see also Brenda Horrigan et al., What Foreign Investors Should Know About the New
Russian Criminal Code, RUSS. & COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., Jan. 27, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Rcblr File.
93. See Yeltsin Signs Decree Abolishing Tax Concession, (BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Apr. 4,1997), available in LEXIS, News File, Bbcswb File.
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practical measures to improve its dismal rate of tax collection. For
example, tax authorities launched a media campaign by focusing on
the benefits of tax revenue, such as new roads, schools, and housing
in order encourage citizens to pay their taxes.' The tax police also
have increased their enforcement efforts during the first six months
of this year, and subsequently have uncovered approximately 10,000
violations and offenses, identified 22,700 individuals who did not
register with the tax inspectorates, and commenced criminal
prosecutions against 2,900 tax evaders.95
Most importantly, the Yeltsin government has taken a harder
approach to non-payment and created the "Provisional (or
Temporary) Extraordinary Commission for Strengthening Tax and
Budgetary Discipline," known as the "VChK," which is responsible
for collecting taxes in arrears.6 The VChK, whose name evokes
memories of Lenin's "Cheka," the secret police force that evolved
into the KGB,' includes armed tax police who have so far enjoyed
some success in their endeavors." In a scare-tactic media campaign
to promote the efforts of the VChK, the government has run
television advertisements showing tax police carrying "AK-47 assault
rifles, sniper rifles, tear gas, grenades, shotguns, [and] bullet-proof
body armour," while warning that "[t]he tax police have guns, and
they know how to use them." Thus, the current tax regime, with its
94. See Andrew Meier, Russia's New War on Taxes; An Ominously Named Commission
Targets Tax Cheats, Raising Fear But Little Prospect of Success, TIME (Int'l ed.), Dec. 16, 1996,
at 24. Some of these ads, however, are far from innocuous; a recent television spot depicted a
tax evader being assaulted by a pair of clowns. See Marina Lapenkova, Russian Tax Inspectors
Find Old Habits Die Hard, Agence France-Presse, Mar. 30, 1997, translated and available in
1997 WL2087012.
95. See Itar-TASS Domestic News Digest of August 11, ITAR-TASS, Aug. 11, 1997,
translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File.
96. See Decree on the Provisional Extraordinary Commission under the President of the
Russian Federation for Strengthening Tax and Budgetary Discipline, RF Presidential Decree
No. 1428 (Oct. 11, 1996), translated and available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rflaw File (with
amendments and addenda as of November 1, 1996); see also Itar-Tass Domestic Economic
News Digest of April 12, 1997, ITAR-TASS, Apr. 12, 1997, translated and available in LEXIS,
News Library, Tass File; Michael R. Gordon, On the Road to Capitalism, Tax Breakdown for
Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,1997, at Al.
97. See Ways of Making Russians Pay, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 1996, at 48.
98. For example, tax receipts increased by 900 million rubles in the first month following
the VChK's creation. See Meier, supra note 94, at 24. It is also interesting to note that the
VChK work on a "bounty system" whereby they retain half of tax monies collected. Id.
99. Miranda Anichkina, Russian Tax Police Go To Work With AK-47 Rifles, EUROPEAN,
Apr. 3, 1997, at 5.
1997]
150 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW
legal provisions and enforcement mechanisms, has generally
attempted to incorporate Russian citizens into a modem, Western
system of taxation.
IV. INCOME TAX AVOIDANCE BY CITIZENS OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Although personal income taxes comprise only a small
percentage of government revenues in Russia,'" the collection of
these personal income taxes remains problematic as many citizens
seek to circumvent payment of tax through the use of various
avoidance practices. Five of these tax avoidance practices will be
discussed below.
A. Methods of Tax Avoidance
The first and most obvious method of tax avoidance used by
Russian citizens is the simple non-reporting of income, which results
in non-payment of tax. Although relatively low personal income tax
rates exist in the Russian Federation, it is estimated that Russian
families underreport their wages by approximately 40%. '0' For
example, one Russian citizen reported that he had not paid taxes
since he left a government job three years earlier."°e This non-
reporting of income is facilitated by the Russian tax police's tendency
only to scrutinize those taxpayers with the "clearest financial records
and transparent investments.""' Therefore, generating no paper trail
with the State Tax Service almost guarantees that the tax police will
not come knocking.
Non-reporting of income also encompasses the receipt of
salaries-in-kind. In recent months, many Russian business entities
have experienced severe difficulties paying monetary compensation
to their employees and have resorted to the payment of salaries-in-
kind.'O For example, each employee of a women's underwear factory
100. Personal income taxes comprise 7.5% of government revenues in Russia whereas they
comprise approximately 30% of government revenues in Western Europe. See Gordon, supra
note 96, at Al.
101. See Avraham Sharma, Inside Russia's True Economy, 103 FOREIGN POLICY 110, 112
(June 1996).
102. See Wendy Sloane et al., Dodging Taxes and Fudging Forms is de Rigeur Around the
World, CHRISTIAN Sm. MONrrOR, Apr. 12,1995, at 1.
103. See Gordon, supra note 96, at As.
104. See Daniel Rosenblum, Russia's Mounting Wage Debt, J. COMMERCE, Feb. 20, 1997, at
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located in Volgograd recently received seven to nine bras in lieu of
salary; each employee in a tire factory located in Kazakhstan
received two tires instead of backpay.l 5 Under the Income Tax on
Natural Persons Act, salaries-in-kind are technically a component of
total annual income." However, because it is unreasonable for the
financially-strapped payor of these salaries-in-kind to deduct any tax
due, Russian citizens continue to engage in the practice of non-
reporting of income as they would with wages paid in currency.
The second tax avoidance practice involves the use of interest-
free loans as substitute wage payments."l In this scheme, an
employer makes a small interest-free loan to his employee in lieu of
salary. After the employee deposits this "loan" into a bank savings
account, the employer pays the involved bank the rest of the
employee's salary plus a small service charge. The bank turns around
and pays interest on the employee's savings account at an elevated
rate, often 1000% or more.s Thus, the employee's salary is paid as a
combination loan/interest payment. Because the employee promises
to pay back the loan over a lengthy time period (typically ten years),
the effect of inflation on the Russian ruble assures risk-free
repayment. Until January 1997, the current regime taxed neither the
loan made to, nor the interest received by, the employee.
The adoption of Federal Act No. 11-FZ by the Duma in
December 1996 now makes this scheme fully taxable.' 9 First, the
employee must include in taxable income the difference between the
7A (citing November 1996 survey which found that two-thirds of Russian citizens are not
receiving wages on time).
105. See id.
106. See Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, supra note 75, art. 2 (providing that
"[i]ncome derived in kind, shall be calculated as part of total annual income at the state
controlled prices or, if such prices are not available, at free (market) prices at the date of
income receipt.").
107. See The Strange Saga of Decree No. 1215 Reveals Serious Problems in Russia, RUSS. &
COMMONWEALTH BUS. L. REP., Oct. 5,1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rcblr File; see
also Daniel Williams, Russia's Ever-Mounting Back Taxes; Debt-Ridden Government
Encumbered By Arrears of $100 Billion, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1997, at A31.
108. See id. Interest rates have been reported as high as 530,000%. See Press Briefing by
Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Shatalov (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, Apr.
25, 1997), translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
109. See Amendments to RF Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, RF Federal Act No. 11-
FZ (Dec. 25, 1996), translated and available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rusleg File [hereinafter
Amendments to Income Tax on Natural Persons Act]; see also Russia Increases Profit and
Personal Income Taxes, RuSS. & COMMONWEALTH BUS. L. REP., Feb. 12, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Rcblr File.
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interest that the employee pays to the employer under the terms of
the loan (e.g., zero) and the interest that the employee would have to
pay if the loan's interest rate equaled two-thirds of the Russian
Federation Central Bank's refinance rate, but only if the loan's
interest rate is less than two-thirds of the refinance rate I" Second,
for employee savings accounts with interest rates exceeding the
refinance rate, the amount of interest earned exceeding the amount
which would have been earned at the refinance rate should be
"subject to taxation at the source of payment.' However,
implementation of this provision remains problematic. An earlier
decree charging banks with the responsibility of withholding the
appropriate taxes from their customer's accounts was met with
considerable outrage," and voluntary compliance on the part of
Russian citizens appears doubtful.
A stock-for-salary scheme constitutes the third method of tax
avoidance used by Russian citizens.' Under this scheme, the
employee receives from his employer a stock option, allowing him to
buy a designated number of company shares within a specific time
period at a nominal price., After the employee exercises his option
and purchases company stock, the company immediately buys back
the shares for an inflated amount, representing a tax-free salary
substitute to the employee.
Under a fourth method of tax avoidance known as "cash services
payroll tax evasion,"".4 employees enjoy an indirect tax benefit from
the actions of their employer-enterprises. The enterprise executes a
fictitious contract with a "cash services firm" under which the firm
agrees to perform a specified task. The enterprise uses its payroll
money to pay the firm for the fictitious job, and the firm, after
deducting a small fee, almost immediately gives the cash payment
back to the enterprise. The enterprise then pays its workers using
110. See Amendments to Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, supra note 109, art. 3, para.
1(ab); see also Russia Increases Profit and Personal Income Taxes, supra note 109.
111. See Amendments to Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, supra note 109, art. 3, para.
1(m); see also Russia Increases Profit and Personal Income Taxes, supra note 109.
112. A presidential decree issued in August 1996 appeared to place this responsibility on
banks; however, strong business protests and rumors of mass closures of personal bank
accounts prompted the rescission of this decree within a matter of weeks. See The Strange Saga
of Decree No. 1215, supra note 107.
113. See id.
114. See Neela Banerjee, In Russia, to the Victor Go the Headaches, WALL ST. J., June 13,
1996, at A8.
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this cash and reports a much smaller payroll amount to the State Tax
Service. This scheme reduces the tax burden not only of the involved
enterprise, but also of its employees, as the enterprise is responsible
for paying the personal income tax of all of its employees who hold
only one job."
A variant on the cash service tax avoidance method involves the
use of insurance to produce tax-free income.116 An enterprise
executes an insurance contract under which its employees are insured
against some future event that is certain to occur (e.g., that snow will
fall during the winter months). When the specified event does occur,
the insurance company pays these employees the exact amount of
money that they would have received as wages. Under the current
tax regime these workers receive tax-free wage payments because the
receipt of insurance proceeds is not subject to taxation.
A final method of tax avoidance involves sending money abroad.
Methods used by Russian citizens to export capital include the
payment of fictitious invoices sent by legitimate Western companies
or the transport of suitcases loaded with cash onto international
flights leaving Moscow, a practice facilitated by the payment of
bribes to customs officials."1 For example, Russians have used cash
carried in suitcases to buy luxury villas in Cyprus."' Russian tax
officials estimate that this flight of capital deprives the Russian
government of approximately $50 billion in tax revenue per year.19
115. See text accompanying note 77. However, Russian officials have drafted a law which
would make large cash transactions between firms illegal. See Maxim Ognev, Russian
Authorities Move to Restrict Cash Transactions, Agence France Presse, Sept. 17, 1997,
translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Afp File.
116. This method was described by Alexander Pochinok, then chairman of the Duma's
Subcommittee on Tax Legislation and now head of the State Tax Service, at a conference held
at Duke University in January 1997. See Michael Newcity, Russian Legislator Discusses
Prospects for Tax Reform, 14 TAXNOTES INT'L 1033,1034 (1997); see also Williams, supra note
107.
117. See Vincent Boland, Russian Mafia Has $10bn in Swiss Bank, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1997, at 3.
118. See James Hansam, Sunshine Isle Lures Moscow Billions, EVENING STANDARD, July
31, 1997, at 35.
119. See Brzezinski, supra note 5, at 1. The State Tax Service is considering a limited tax
amnesty program whereby capital held abroad could be brought back to Russia without being
taxed. See Natalia Varnavskaya, Tax Amnesty of Illicit Capital in the Making; State Prepared to
Launder Money for Ten Percent, KOMMERS., Oct. 7, 1997, translated and available in LEXIS,
News Library, Spd File (describing a draft bill which would allow Russian citizens to declare
any concealed income or property and only be subject to a tax in the range of 10-15%); see
also Speech By President Boris Yeltsin at the Federation Council (Official Kremlin International
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B. Explanations for Income Tax Avoidance
. Possible explanations for income tax avoidance by Russian
citizens can be grouped into two categories: (1) flaws within the
current tax regime; and (2) factors external to the current tax regime.
1. Flaws Within the Current Tax Regime. Simply stated, the
current tax regime is a morass of complexity and confusion that
daunts even the 'most ambitious and conscientious taxpayer. One
source estimates that this regime consists of 200 taxes found in
approximately 4,000 documents, including, "1200 presidential
decrees, government orders and ministerial instructions... [and]
another 3,000 legislative and sub-legislative acts."'2  Frequent
changes in tax legislation have served to further complicate this
situation. With over 800 modifications made in the first five years
alone, the tax regime has been analogized to "a magazine that comes
out once a week, because it keeps changing., 121  Once federal tax
legislation has been enacted, each level of government may
determine only the type and size of taxes to be levied in their
respective jurisdictions based upon affirmative language in the
legislation.' However, in practice, governmental authorities have
not followed this provision but instead have enacted their own tax
laws, resulting in multiple layers of tax legislation.'2 The current tax
regime also provides little guidance as to the meaning of important
terms, such as. "taxpayers" and "bases of taxation."'' 4 In addition,
News Broadcast, Sept. 24,1997), translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File,
State Tax Service Chief Outlines Measures to Increase Tax Take (BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Apr. 29, 1997), translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Bbcswb File.
120. Mikhail Berger, Not Everyone Wants Simpler Tax Collection, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb.
26, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File; see also Speech by Alexander
Pochinok, State Tax Service Chief, at the Monthly Luncheon of the American Chamber of
Commerce in Russia (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, June 18,1997), translated
and available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (stating that there are approximately 230
types of taxes covered by 1500 to 2000 pieces of tax legislation).
121. George Melloan, Global View: Why Russia Needs a Bolshoi Tax, WALL ST. J., Sep. 25,
1995, at A19. Several legitimate explanations underlie these frequent changes, including the
need to respond to a changing Russian economy and to evolving tax avoidance practices. See
Kathleen Matthews, Russian Tax Reform Includes New Tax Code, 10 TAX NoTEs INT'L 479,
479 (1995).
122. Fundamentals of the RF Tax System, supra note 1, art. 18, para. 2. For example,
regional legislative bodies may introduce taxes collected for education, while local legislative
bodies may establish a broad range of taxes. See id. art. 20, paras. 2,4.
123. See Matthews, supra note 121, at 480.
124. See Fundamentals of the RF Tax System, supra note 1, art. 3 (taxpayer), art. 5 (bases
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although the general provisions of the current tax regime (outlined in
"Fundamentals of the RF Tax System Act") do set forth the rights
and duties of both the taxpayer2' and the tax authorities,1" albeit in a
cursory manner, the specific provisions governing personal taxation
(found in "On Taxation of Natural Persons Act") contain merely a
short description of the duties of the taxpayer and omit entirely any
description of those of the tax authorities."V It is therefore not
surprising that the actual income tax declaration required to be filed
is incomprehensible to even the most sophisticated taxpayers.'
According to one tax inspector, not one taxpayer in her jurisdiction
was able to file an income tax declaration without assistance.'
Three other aspects of the tax payment procedure also
complicate the existing regime. First, because the tax authorities do
not currently have a comprehensive database of taxpayer
information, they may apply enforcement mechanisms in an
of taxation); see also Matthews, supra note 118, at 481 ("Because certain definitions have not
been formulated and each taxpayer often understands these terms in his or her own way, the
argument between the tax authorities and the taxpayer becomes about the terms, not about the
essence of the matter....").
125. See Fundamentals of the RF Tax System, supra note 1, art. 11 (taxpayer duties), art. 12
(taxpayer rights).
126. See Fundamentals of the RF Tax System, supra note 1, art. 14 (rights of the tax
authorities), art. 16 (duties and responsibilities of the tax authorities).
127. See Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, supra note 75, art. 20. Article 20 also fails to
include any enumeration of the rights of the taxpayer. See id.
128. See Irina Yasina, Taxpayers Buy Right to Gripe, MOSCoW TIMES, Apr. 15, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (describing how a woman with a PhD in
economics was unable to complete the Russian tax form).
129. See id The State Tax Service has created, subject to final approval, a new, less
complicated tax declaration form and is planning an educational campaign to assist taxpayers
in using the new form. See Itar-Tass Economic News Digest ofNovember 21, supra note 21; see
also Press Conference with State Tax Service Head Alexander Pochinok, supra note 21.
130. See Gordon, supra note 96, at Al. However, the IMF is financing a project to issue
personal identification numbers to all Russian citizens. See Yelena Loria, All Russians to be
Numbered, RUSS. PRESS DIG., Apr. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Spd File. In
addition, a system of social security numbers has been introduced to track employer
contributions to the Russian Federal Pension Fund but currently tax officials cannot access the
information on wages contained therein. See Mark Whitehouse, Russia Phases In Social
Security Numbers, Moscow TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms
File. Alexander Pochinok, head of the State Tax Service, recently announced that the State
Tax Service is starting to compile "files" of "tax histories" on taxpayers. See Press Conference
with State Tax Service Head Alexander Pochinok, supra note 21. In addition, the Tax Police
now maintain a computer database, called "Isinpol," to track those citizens who have
committed tax violations. See TV Reports Computerized Tax Clampdown, Interviews Interior
Minister (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 4, 1997), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Bbcswb File.
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arbitrary fashion based on potentially inaccurate information.
Second, penalties under the current system, which often amount to
two to three times the taxes owed, may apply even to innocent
mistakes." Third, Russia has no judicial forum devoted specifically
to the litigation of tax issues." Instead, Russian citizens must
petition a people's court to obtain a judicial hearing. However,
because few courts consider themselves skilled enough in the area of
tax law to accept the challenge, judicial hearings are difficult to
obtain.m
Given the confusing nature of the system, and the fact that tax
laws, regulations, and rulings do not appear in a single official
publication,'6 many Russians engage in tax avoidance simply because
they often cannot calculate out how much they owe and where and
when to pay. In addition, even those citizens who may want to
voluntarily comply with the existing regime may be deterred from
doing so because if they make a mistake on their income declaration,
they will be penalized under a somewhat arbitrary system and left
with scant judicial recourse. 35
2. Factors External to the Current Tax Regime. Several
explanations for income tax avoidance by Russian citizens exist
independently of the flaws contained in current tax laws. First,
Russian citizens possess little to no experience with a tax system that
requires affirmative compliance, i.e., the voluntary filing of an
income tax declaration and voluntary payment of income tax.
Basically, no personal income tax existed under the tsarist regimes of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 6 and taxation of
personal income during the Soviet Era placed the burden of
compliance on employers. In general, taxpayers were required to
take affirmative action with respect to the tax laws only in very
131. See Fundamentals of the RF Tax System, supra note 1, art. 13, para. 1(a). However, a
1996 presidential decree forgives those tax violations which are inadvertent and voluntarily
disclosed by the taxpayer to the tax authorities. See Main Lines of Tax Reform in the RF and
Measures to Tighten Up Tax and Payments Discipline, RF President's Edict No. 685 (May 8,
1996), para. 13, translated and available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rusleg File.
132. See Matthews, supra note 121, at 481-82.
133. See id.
134. See David F. Black, So You Want to Invest in Russia? A Legislative Analysis of the
Foreign Investment Climate in Russia, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 123, 147 (1996).
135. See Ride a High Tax Horse, supra note 91, at A6.
136. See supra Section II(A).
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limited situations.37 Therefore, Russians are simply unaccustomed to
calculating taxable income, filing income tax forms, and voluntarily
remitting tax due.'
Because of their lack of experience with a modern, Western
system of taxation, Russians fail to appreciate the criminality of
income tax avoidance. In a recent survey conducted by the Russian
Market Research Co., 61% of those responding stated that they do
not consider tax evasion to be a crime, while only 14% believed that
it is.f 9 This perception is furthered by the fact that tax evasion in
Russia is categorized under the Criminal Code as only an economic
crime and not placed in the more serious category of crimes against
the state.1' Thus, beyond being unaccustomed with a tax system
requiring voluntary compliance, Russian citizens also lack an
understanding of its mandatory legal nature.
Second, because Russians are keenly aware that many well-
connected business enterprises and individuals escape with non-
payment of tax, they are provided with little incentive for voluntary
compliance with the tax laws. Substantial press coverage has been
devoted to tax avoidance engaged in by Russian enterprises and the
State Tax Service's resulting permissive attitude. For example, media
reports have noted that a high percentage of Russia's tax debt is
137. See supra Section II(B). Only those taxpayers engaged in private activities had an
obligation to prepare and file an income tax return with the tax authorities. See id.
138. See Viktor K. Grebenshkov, Inspectors Press Russians to Pay Taxes; Revenue: Moscow
is Converting to the Western European System. Citizens are Unused to Filling Out the Forms,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at A10 ("Russians have not filled out forms and fulfilled the other
taxation rites long familiar to Westerners; for generations, wage earners in the former Soviet
Union needed no knowledge of taxation since taxes were automatically deducted from salaries
by factory accountants"); Lapenkova, supra note 94 ("Russians have been slow to acquire the
habit of filling in tax forms"). Minister Yevgeny Yasin has aptly described this culture of non-
payment: "Over the last 80 years, no-one in Russia has paid any taxes at all. The state took
our money away from us and gave each person exactly the amount which it considered
necessary. We, the population and the enterprises are not accustomed to paying out of our own
pocket." Trading Punches on Tax Reform, Moscow NEwS, Sept. 4, 1997, translated and
available in LEXIS, News Library, Moscows File.
139. Steve Liesman, Russia's Chubais Faces High Stakes Test, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1997,
at A15. In fact, Alexei Anisimov, allegedly the first Moscow businessman to receive a jail
sentence for income tax evasion, expected only to receive a verbal reprimand in court for his
tax-evading practices and was stunned when he was sentenced to one year in prison. See
Williams, supra note 107, at A31.
140. See Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, RF Act No. 63-FZ (June 13, 1996), art.
198, translated and available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rflaw File; see also Natalya
Varnavskaya, Vitaly Artyukhov: Russia Needs a System in Which Failing to Pay Taxes Would
be Frightening, Ruinous and Shameful, KOMMERS., Apr. 8,1997, at 1.
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owed by a relatively small group of enterprises. Some sources state
that half of Russia's tax debt is the responsibility of 180 companies.1
while others suggest that over 40% of the debt is owed by just
seventy-two companies.142 Alexander Pochinok, head of the State
Tax Service, has calculated that the tax debt owed by the eighteen
largest tax debtors reaches over 100 trillion rubles.143 In particular,
AvtoVAZ, Russia's largest car manufacturer and the country's
largest tax debtor,1" did not face pressure from the VChK to pay its
debt until the summer of 1997.145 In addition, the Russian
government has publicly acknowledged that approximately 200
government officials failed to submit their tax declarations this year
in a timely manner. However, the Tax Inspectorates may not verify
the declarations of civil servants, nor impose punishments or fines for
either late or improper submissions under current tax law.46
Furthermore, many wealthy individuals appear to be less than
forthcoming in declaring income on their tax declarations. A recent
media report revealed that oil and media magnate Boris Berezovsky,
whose net worth is estimated at $3 billion, declared under $500,000 in
income and valued his entire net worth at $38,000 on his 1996 tax
form.47 Therefore, many Russians notice that the more privileged
141. See Susan Sachs, Russia's Vicious Winter, NEWSDAY, Oct. 20,1996, at A8.
142. See Gordon, supra note 96, at Al.
143. See Press Conference with State Tax Service Head Alexander Pochinok, supra note 21.
144. AvtoVAZ was reported to owe approximately 2.8 trillion rubles, or $500 million, as of
April 1, 1997. See Russia Companies Seen Restructuring Tax Arrears, Reuters Eur. Bus. Rep.,
May 23,1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reueub File.
145. As of late July 1997, a decision was "nearing completion" on the tax debt owed by
AvtoVAZ. See Press Conference with State Tax Service Head Alexander Pochinok, supra note
20. In August 1997, AvtoVAZ announced that it would issue stock shares to the Russian
government as collateral for its tax obligation. See Russia's Biggest Car Maker to Issue New
Shares to Clear Tax Debt (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 8, 1997), available in
LEXIS, News Library, Bbcswb File. In October 1997, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
approved the rescheduling of AvtoVAZ's 2.85 trillion ruble ($490 million) tax debt over a
period of ten years in exchange for the government's receipt of 50% plus one share of
AvtoVAZ's outstanding stock as collateral. If AvtoVAZ once again falls behind in tax
payments, the government may sell the shares to recoup the tax arrearages. See Boris
Aliabyev, AvtoVAZ Spared From Bankruptcy, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 17, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File; Lada Automaker Staves Off Bankruptcy With Debt Deal,
Agence France Presse, Oct. 17, 1997, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Afp
File.
146. See Press Conference with State Tax Service Head Alexander Pochinok, supra note 20.
147. See Bigger Fish Will Evade New Taxes, Moscow TMEs, Oct. 23, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File. The tax authorities have begun to crack down on wealthy
individuals. In September, several Russian pop celebrities were chastised on national
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taxpayers openly disregard the tax laws,1' and question why they
should part with their hard-earned rubles to comply with the system.
Third, corruption and political favors permeate the current
Russian tax regime, leaving Russian citizens with little motivation to
voluntarily comply with such a distasteful system. For example, one
Moscow taxpayer revealed that his tax burden depends upon the
specific deal he forges with a tax inspector.149 Evidence also exists
that "cronyism" has invaded the Russian tax system: the Russian
Finance Ministry estimates that tax breaks for the wealthy and
politically-connected approach $28.6 billion per year."'0 The VChK
delayed investigating Gazprom, a gas conglomerate owing over 14
trillion rubles ($2.6 billion) in delinquent taxes, allegedly because
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who heads the tax
commission, once served as chairman of the company." An inquiry
television for under-reporting income on their tax declarations. See Daniel Williams, Russia's
New Pop Music Stars Find Their Celebrity Taxing; Delinquent Performers Get a Televised
Tongue-Lashing as Part of the Yeltsin Government's Revenue Collection Drive, WASH. POST,
Oct. 1, 1997, at A19. More importantly, a new draft law would require retailers to provide the
government with the name and address of any individual purchasing certain items, such as
automobiles, boats, airplanes, real estate, stock, gold, and jewelry, worth one thousand times
the minimum wage, or approximately $14,000. The tax police would then be allowed to contact
the purchaser and receive a written declaration of the source of funds used for the purchase.
Purchasers who fail to comply would be subject to fines ranging from $1500 to $15,000. See
Christian Lowe, Tax Law Aimed at Big-Ticket Purchases, Moscow TIMES, Nov. 25, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File. As of early December 1997, the draft law,
after being approved by the Duma but rejected by the Federation Council (upper house of
Parliament), is being revised by a conciliation committee before being resubmitted for full
parliamentary approval. See Christian Lowe, Sales Tax Reporting Bill Blocked, MoScow
TIMES, Dec. 5,1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
148. See Anichkina, supra note 99, at 5. However, the VChK has been summoning Russia's
largest tax debtors and deciding whether each debtor-enterprise will pay the debt immediately
in full, be allowed to reschedule its tax debt using shares or asset-backed bonds as collateral
(pursuant to Government Decree Number 254) or be forced to declare bankruptcy. See Press
Conference with State Tax Service Head Alexander Pochinok, supra note 20; see also Speech by
Alexander Pochinok, State Tax Service Chief, at the Monthly Luncheon of the American
Chamber of Commerce in Russia, supra note 120. In restructuring these tax debts, the VChK
must follow the procedures outlined in Government Decree Number 254. See Conditions and
Rules of Restructuring Debt Arrears of Organizations on Payments into the Federal Budget,
RF Government Decree No. 254 (Mar. 5, 1997), translated and available in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, Rusleg File.
149. See Zolotov, supra note 79 (quoting Georgy Konotop, a self-employed retailer of
clothing and luggage at a Moscow market: "If I say that I made, let's say, 500,000 a month, the
inspector would say, 'Shame on you! Write down some more. Otherwise you are even below
the minimal standard of living.' So I write down 600,000.").
150. Paddock, supra note 8, at Al.
151. See Meier, supra note 94, at 24. Gazprom, in response to a government recent
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by the Russian Parliament has uncovered that several top members
of the State Tax Service spent 6.6 billion rubles ($1.1 million) of
taxpayer money to buy and renovate apartments for their own
personal use, 2 while a tax inspector and a tax policeman recently
were arrested for extorting bribes from business men in St.
Petersburg.' Paradoxically, ordinary Russians are expected to pay
their taxes in full and on time, yet the salaries received by the tax
police are exempt from taxation.'" These shady dealings and political
favoritism have turned Russian citizens toward non-payment,
prompting one Moscow taxpayer to comment, "I have no idea where
my tax money is going .... It's probably going into the pockets of
the inspectors."'55
Fourth, Russian taxpayers possess a generally negative view of
their government and are unwilling to finance its activities. Many
Russian citizens learned to distrust and dislike their often corrupt
government during the Soviet era," and this skepticism and distaste
has carried over to the post-Communist Yeltsin regime. One
taxpayer commented that "there is a general view that people here
have been robbed by the government so much in the past that now
they don't owe anything to this government."' "r This perception
stems, in part, from the large amount of unchecked criminal activity
in Russian society" and more recently from the huge outlays for
military operations in Chechnya." 9 Thus, many Russian citizens have
little faith in the workings of their new government and simply feel
that "only an idiot pays all his taxes to our corrupt government.'"lW
crackdown on tax evasion by enterprises, paid its entire tax debt at the end of June. See
Holman, supra note 20, at A14.
152. See Anichkina, supra note 99, at 5.
153. See Russian Tax Police Heighten Enforcement of Big Names' Tax Bills, 15 TAX NOTES
INT'L 448, 448 (1997). In addition, the Russian government has recently purchased two luxury
yachts, valued at approximately $500,000, for the use of high-ranking government officials. See
Christian Lowe, Kremlin Buys Yacht for Officials, MOSCOW TAIES, Dec. 17, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
154. See Berger, supra note 120.
155. Sachs, supra note 141, at As.
156. See Paddock, supra note 8, at Al ("Communism lasted longer here [in Russia], and it
was harsher and more corrupt than that in the socialist systems of Central Europe.").
157. Wendy Sloane et al., supra note 102, at 1.
158. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
159. See Paddock, supra note 8, at Al (quoting a Russian citizen: "I think a major part of
taxes was blown up in smoke in the war in Chechnya.").
160. I.
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Taxpayers cannot point to any concrete improvements in their
standard of living since the current tax regime was instituted, and
thus see no reason to continue paying absent any visible changes."
This viewpoint was aptly summarized by a Moscow tax inspector: "If
people lived in normal apartments, rode in good public transport, if
their children went to good schools and they always received a good
salary on time, then the necessity to pay taxes would have infiltrated
their minds better."1"'
Finally, the non-paying shadow or underground economy in
Russia provides Russian citizens with yet another example of
permitted tax avoidance. The shadow economy in Russia, supported
by persons ranging from hard-core criminals to those merely engaged
in questionable business dealings," constitutes approximately 40% of
Russia's current Gross Domestic Product.6 This shadow economy
represents an overwhelmingly large portion of the Russian economic
system. "[I]n the industrial countries the shadow economy accounts
for 5-7% of the GDP, whereas in Africa and Latin America this
figure reaches 30%. Only in Ukraine is the percentage bigger-
50.'1'6 The Russian shadow economy obviously decreases the tax
revenue raised by the State Tax Service because its activities occur
off-the-books and therefore its profits are not subject to taxation.
The shadow economy also diverts potential tax revenue away from
the state treasury through the collection of bribes, which monies
would have perhaps been otherwise available for tax payments.'
1
The fact that this shadow economy is allowed to flourish and escape
taxation adds to the perception among Russian citizens that both the
tax system and the Russian government are corrupt and that crime
161. See Id.
162. Fred Coleman, Meanwhile, in Russia... U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 14,1997, at
10.
163. See Alexander Kakotkin, Triumphant March of Crimes, RUSS. PRESS DIG., July 24,
1996, available in 1996 WL 6538100.
164. This finding was made in a recent study conducted by Louise Shelley, a professor of
law at American University in Washington, D.C. See Jonathan Lynn, Focus-Mafia Runs
Nearly Half Russian Economy, Reuters Fin. Serv., Mar. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Reufin File. The Russian government has acknowledged that the shadow economy
"influences" approximately 50% of Russia's GDP but believes that the shadow economy itself
only accounts for between 20-23% of GDP. See Press Conference Regarding the "Shadow
Economy" in Russia (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, Oct. 6, 1997), translated
and available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
165. Kakotkin, supra note 163.
166. See Lynn, supra note 164.
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pays in the area of personal income taxation.
V. EXAMINATION OF THE DRAFT TAX CODE
After four years of work67 a new draft tax code consisting of a
General Part and three Special Parts was submitted to the Russian
Duma by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on April 30, 1997."
The General Part of the draft code provides, inter alia, lists of taxes at
all three levels (federal, regional, and local), basic principles of the
tax system and of tax accounting, and new procedures for
administrative and judicial appeals.'69 Section XI, contained in one of
the Special Parts, articulates the principles of the federal personal
income tax.
A. Personal Income Taxation Under the Draft Tax Code170
In general, Section XI provides definitions of taxpayer' and
income,72 and more precise instructions for calculating income,i7
exemptions, 4 deductions,' and concessions. 6  Like the current
regime, the draft code differentiates between income earned at the
primary workplace and that earned at additional places of
employment. If an individual holds only one job, his employer-
enterprise is required to calculate tax due on earned wages, make
advance tax payments" either monthly178 or at the time that the
167. See Press Briefing by Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Shatalov, supra note 108 (stating
that initial work on the draft tax code began in the spring of 1993).
168. The draft code was initially approved by the Duma on its first reading on June 19,
1997, but then abrogated by a Duma resolution passed on November 19, 1997. See supra notes
23-26 and accompanying text.
169. See Andrei I. Belinski, The New Tax Code as a Cure for the Russian Tax System,
EAST/WEST EXECUTIVE GuIDE, Mar. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
170. This section provides an overview of the taxation of income earned by individuals at
places of employment and does not furnish information about the taxation of other sources of
personal income such as that received from property sales or business investments.
171. See May 1997 Draft of Personal Income Tax Provisions, art. 606 (document not
publicly available) [hereinafter Draft of Personal Income Tax Provisions].
172. See id. art. 607-08.
173. See id. art. 626-27.
174. See id. art. 610.
175. See id. art. 612-18.
176. See id. art. 619-24.
177. See id. art. 626, para. 1.
178. See id. art. 626, para. 2(1).
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taxpayer receives the wages,179 and file a tax return by February 1 of
the following year."m If an individual holds more than one job, each
employer-enterprise must determine the amount of tax due, make
advance tax payments, and file a tax return by February 1.' An
individual is responsible for making advance tax payments only if
engaging in economic activity as an entrepreneur" or "receiving
income outside of a labor relationship." ''1 In these cases, the
taxpayer must file a return by April 1 declaring the actual income
received over the course of the tax period, any expenses directly
related to earning this income, and any prepayments made. In all
cases, the taxpayer has the duty to maintain records of income,
expenses, and advance taxes paid," while the employer-enterprise is
under a similar duty to maintain records of income and advance taxes
paid.1&5
The draft code also permits taxable income to be reduced by
several deductions, exemptions, and concessions. Several general
deductions, such as the standard deduction0' and the deduction for
children and dependents," may be taken by most taxpayers. The tax
exemptions, which are similar to those permitted during the Soviet
Era, are based on the nature of income earned;... tax concessions are
granted based on the status of the taxpayer." Once taxable income
179. See id. art. 626, para. 2(6).
180. See id. art. 628, para. 2(3).
181. See id. art. 626, para. 2(1), id. art. 628, para. 2(3).
182. See id. art. 626, para. 2(2), id. art. 626, para. 5.
183. lE art. 626, para. 3. Although the draft code does not define the parameters of article
626, paragraph 3, most likely this provision applies to individuals who are working on a
temporary basis for an enterprise.
184. See it art. 611, para. 1, 4.
185. See id. art. 611, para. 2(1), id. art. 627, para. 1.
186. See id. art. 612, para. 2. The standard deduction, calculated monthly, equals the
minimum monthly wage established by federal law and is deducted directly from monthly
wages by the income source if advance tax payments are being made or by the taxpayer if tax is
paid at the end of the tax period. ld. art. 614, para. 1.
187. See id. art. 612, para. 2(3). The taxpayer is entitled to a monthly deduction equal to
the minimum monthly wage under federal law for each child or dependent. ld Again, the
deduction is taken directly at the income source if advance tax payments are being made or by
the taxpayer if tax is paid at the end of the tax period. Met art. 615, para. 8.
188. See generally id. art. 610.
189. See generally ide arts. 619-24. Taxpayers who qualify may deduct two, four, nine or
fourteen times the minimum monthly wage from their earned income each month. See id. art.
619, paras. 1(1)-1(4). Again, tax concessions are taken after tax deductions directly at the
income source if advance tax payments are being made or by the taxpayer if tax is paid at the
end of the tax period. See id. art. 620, paras. 1-2.
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has been calculated, the Russian taxpayer faces two tax rates: 12% on
income less than 60 million rubles ($10,540) per year and 30% on
income over 60 million rubles per year."
B. Analysis of the Draft Tax Code
An examination of the newly-submitted draft code raises three
issues: (1) whether the draft code addresses the previously-
enumerated flaws in the current tax regime; (2) whether the draft
code mitigates those factors external to the current tax regime which
impede tax collection; and (3) whether the draft code addresses the
specific methods of tax avoidance engaged in by Russian citizens.
1. Does the Draft Tax Code Address the Flaws in the Current
Tax Regime? In many respects, the draft code does attempt to
correct the perceived weaknesses of Russia's current tax system.
First, the draft code simplifies several aspects of the tax system. For
example, the draft code drastically reduces the types of taxes that can
be imposed at the federal, regional, and local levels from
approximately two hundred 91 to around thirty,1" thereby streamlining
the tax system. In addition, the code clarifies which types of taxes
each level of government may impose." More importantly, the draft
code simplifies the personal income tax system by imposing only two
marginal tax rates on individuals,"9 and by placing the compliance
obligation somewhat more heavily on the employer-enterprise.'95
190. See id art. 625, para. 1. In effect, the draft code decreases the number of individual
income tax brackets from five to two. See, e.g., Yeltsin Over First Tax Hurdle But Still Some
Way to Go, FIN. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at 2. The State Duma Committee for Budget, Taxes and
Banks has proposed an alternative rate structure with progressive tax rates beginning at 20
million rubles and the maximum tax rate imposed on incomes of 100 rubles and above. See
Press Conference with State Duma Committee for Budget, Taxes and Banks (Official Kremlin
International News Broadcast, Oct. 29,1997), translated and available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
191. The current system is composed of approximately 40 taxes at the federal level and
between 70 and 140 taxes combined at the regional and local levels. See Newcity, supra note
116, at 1033.
192. See id.
193. The draft code provides for twelve taxes at the federal level, eight taxes at the regional
level, and twelve taxes at the local level. See Russia's Draft Tax Code: General Part (Chapters
1-12) (Unofficial Translation), 96 TAX NOTES INT'L 237-22 (Dec. 9, 1996), available in LEXIS,
Taxana Library, Tni File [hereinafter Draft Russian Tax Code Part 1].
194. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 177-185 and accompanying text. In essence, only an individual who is
an entrepreneur or working for an employer on a temporary basis must take sole responsibility
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Furthermore, new and stricter procedures for the amendment of tax
legislation presumably will prevent the frequent changes which have
needlessly complicated the current tax regime. For example, Article
9, paragraph 1 of the draft code provides that the establishment,
amendment, or elimination of federal taxes can be made only
through the passage of federal legislation.'6 Regional and local tax
authorities will not be able to layer additional taxes on top of those
delineated in the draft code as they have done in the past because the
draft code stipulates that "[s]tandards (provisions) of the legislative
acts adopted on the basis and in implementation of this Code or in
accordance with this Code cannot run contrary to the standards
(provisions) of this Code or go beyond these provisions."" Finally,
the Russian government also is preparing very simple instructions for
preparing a tax return in order to facilitate voluntary tax
compliance.'"
Second, the draft code contains several measures that allow the
individual taxpayer to more easily comprehend the Russian tax
regime, thereby possibly stimulating voluntary compliance. For
example, the draft code provides detailed definitions for often-
disputed terms such as "taxpayer,""' "economic activity,"m "objects
of taxation,"2''  and "income from sources in the Russian
Federation."2'a The draft code also mandates that each provision
levying a tax must describe the taxpayers affected, the object of
taxation, the applicable tax rate, and the time and procedure for
paying the tax.' In addition, the rights and obligations of both
for the calculation and payment of income tax. Id
196. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part I, supra note 193, art. 9, para. 1.
197. I& art. 4, para. 2. In addition, the Russian Federation Constitutional Court has
recently ruled that Russia's regional governments should not introduce any taxes and
deductions which do not conform to the taxes and deductions stipulated under federal
legislation. See Application Fee for Right of Residence in Moscow Region Deemed Unlawful
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 4, 1997), available in LEXIS, News Library, Bbcswb
File.
198. See Press Conference with Alexander Pochinok (Official Kremlin International News
Broadcast, Apr. 23,1997), translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
199. Draft Russian Tax Code Part I, supra note 193, art. 61.
200. Id. art. 21.
201. Id. art. 91; see also Draft of Personal Income Tax Provisions, supra note 171, art. 607,
para. 1.
202. I& art. 103; see generally Matthews, supra note 121, at 481.
203. See id. art. 6, para. 4.
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taxpayerse and the tax authorities' ° are clearly articulated in the
draft code, which helps the taxpayer comprehend his duty to pay tax
and guards him against unreasonable tax investigations. Moreover,
the draft code outlines the procedures for satisfying a tax obligation
and allows the taxpayer to delay payment for certain periods of
time.' Thus, the taxpayer is given greater flexibility to meet his tax
obligation than under the current regime. The taxpayer may also
make adjustments to a tax return within thirty days of filing and not
be penalized for doing so.'
Finally, the draft code makes available to the taxpayer both
administrative and judicial rights of appeal which are extremely
useful in situations where the taxpayer believes his tax obligation has
been assessed incorrectly. For example, Article 172 of the draft code
stipulates that a taxpayer may submit an application to the relevant
tax body, Tax Board, or other court asserting that the tax authorities
withheld an excessive sum of tax and recover the excessive sum with
interest.' In addition, Article 236 provides the taxpayer with the
right to lodge an appeal against actions of the tax authorities."'0 Most
importantly, a permanent tax court will be created in which Russian
citizens will be able to contest tax liability before making payment of
disputed tax.21 The requirements that each taxpayer be registered
with the local tax authorities at his place of residence,' and be
assigned a taxpayer identification number, should protect the
taxpayer against unfounded accusations of tax violations. Finally, the
204. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part I, supra note 193, arts. 62 (rights of taxpayers), 64
(obligations of taxpayers).
205. See Russia's Draft Tax Code: General Part (Chapters 13-29) (Unofficial Translation),
96 TAX NoTEs INT'L 237-23 (Dec. 9, 1996), art. 226 (rights of tax authorities), art. 227
(obligations of tax authorities), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, Tni File [hereinafter Draft
Russian Tax Code Part 11].
206. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part I, supra note 193, art. 112, 116. Article 628 also
provides detailed guidance as to filing procedures and deadlines for personal tax returns. See
Draft of Personal Income Tax Provisions, supra note 171.
207. The taxpayer can delay payment for one to six months either through deferral or
extension. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part I, supra note 193, art. 134. Another option is for
the taxpayer to delay payment for one to five years through a tax loan. See id. art. 135.
208. See Draft of Personal Income Tax Provisions, supra note 171, art. 628, para. 7.
209. Draft Russian Tax Code Part I, supra note 205, art. 172.
210. See id2 art. 236; see id. arts. 237-38, 243-47 (setting forth the logistics of the appeals
process).
211. See Matthews, supra note 121, at 481-82.
212. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part II, supra note 205, art. 202, para. 1.
213. See id. art. 202, para. 11.
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draft code articulates the rights of individuals charged with tax
violations,214 and sets forth an appeals process for tax judgments,215 to
protect the taxpayer against arbitrary enforcement of the tax laws.
2. Does the Draft Tax Code Curb the External Factors Which
Impede Tax Collection? By eliminating the current plethora of
exemptions and setting forth stringent penalties for tax evasion, the
draft code may reduce the externalities which hinder tax collection.
216
First, the draft code addresses the most conspicuous cases of non-
payment created by the widespread preferential tax treatments by
curtailing some of the more visible tax exemptions which exist under
the current tax regime. For example, the long-time blanket
exemption enjoyed by military personnel has been eliminated.217 The
head of the State Tax Service has publicly announced that he favors
eliminating the tax privileges enjoyed by employees of the Interior
Ministry, including tax inspectors and the tax police.21 '8 The use of
charitable organization status to avoid tax payment, a practice which
is currently subject to exploitation,219 also will be restricted by the
implementation of stricter standards for determining what constitutes
a charitable organization' and charitable activity."1  Hopefully, the
reduction of widespread and visible tax avoidance will motivate the
average Russian taxpayer to comply with the tax laws.
Second, the increase in enumerated tax violations and stringent
penalties in the draft code may reduce the tax-evading shadow
economy, '2 thus partially removing yet another example of tax
214. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part II, supra note 205, art. 327.
215. See id. art. 404.
216. See supra Section iV.B(2).
217. The former exemption was found in Income Tax on Natural Persons Act, supra note
75, art. 3, para. 1(z13) (providing an income exemption for "amounts of money allowances,
monetary rewards and other payments received by military servicemen due to performance of
military service duties"). However, such an exemption for military personnel is not contained
in the relevant section of the draft of personal income tax provisions and therefore has
presumably been eliminated. See Draft of Personal Income Tax Provisions, supra note 171, art.
610.
218. See Press Conference with Alexander Pochinok, supra note 198.
219. See, e.g., Newcity, supra note 116, at 1033 (citing one charitable organization which
was recently able to import into Russia and sell tax-free approximately $4 billion worth of
tobacco, alcohol and automobiles).
220. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part I, supra note 193, art. 53.
221. See id. art 25.
222. Russian government officials have acknowledged that the tax code may represent a
step forward but will by no means eliminate the tax-evading shadow economy. See Press
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avoidance permitted under the current tax regime. More specifically,
the draft code lists twenty-four violations and their attendant
penalties in layman's language.'m Although these provisions may not
sway the truly criminal element of the shadow economy, persons
involved merely in questionable transactions may be deterred by the
weighty penalties which may be incurred. Tax evasion, defined as
those "actions... which are deliberately aimed at avoiding tax
control," carries a sanction of up to three times the amount of tax
due.m In addition, the authors of the draft code envisioned that its
provisions would apply to all types of income, including income
obtained through illegal activities.' With fewer examples of tax
avoidance behavior, Russian taxpayers may be more inclined to file
their tax declarations and pay their tax obligations.
Third, the draft code indirectly addresses the problem of
corruption among the tax authorities, a factor which contributes to
poor tax collection. For example, one code provision charges the tax
police with the task of "preventing, detecting and suppressing
corruption and other criminal offenses in tax bodies."' In addition,
Article 293 makes it a crime, resulting in a fine of fifty times the
monthly minimum wage, for a taxpayer to "unlawfully influence" a
tax official.' The new transparent and comprehensive provisions of
the draft code may discourage taxpayers from engaging in
questionable transactions with tax inspectors regarding the amount of
tax owed and convince taxpayers that the system is fair enough to
warrant compliance.
Finally, although the culture of non-payment is strongly rooted
among Russian citizens,'m the fact that the draft code contains
numerous provisions outlining tax violations may change the
widespread perception that tax evasion is not a crime.'m In addition
to twenty-four express types of tax violations with corresponding
Conference Regarding the "Shadow Economy" in Russia, supra note 164.
223. Draft Russian Tax Code Part II, supra note 205, arts. 269-293.
224. Id. art. 283.
225. See First Deputy Premier Nemtsov Says Tax Evasion is a Grave Crime (BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, June 18,1997), available in LEXIS, News Library, Bbcswb File.
226. Draft Russian Tax Code Part II, supra note 205, art. 221, para. 5.
227. Id- art. 293. However, whether the tax police will enforce the above provisions
remains uncertain given the pervasiveness of crime within Russia.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 136-138.
229. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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penalties,o the general provisions regarding standards of liability for,
and possible defenses to, tax violations"1 should give taxpayers the
clear impression that tax evasion bears dire consequences.
On the other hand, the negative perception of the Russian
government among taxpayers is not a phenomenon that can be easily
changed with the passage of more comprehensive and
comprehensible tax legislation. Nevertheless, the tax code, with its
provisions against favoritism of the wealthy and politically-
connected, may help restore the citizens' faith in their government,
and lead to increased compliance with the tax laws.
3. Does the Draft Tax Code Address the Specific Methods of
Tax Avoidance Used by Russian Citizens? The draft tax code appears
to address the use of several of the methods of tax avoidance, such as
interest-free loans, stock-for-salary schemes, and insurance-for-salary
arrangements. For example, two provisions of the draft code attempt
to curb the use of interest-free loans as substitute wage payments.
First, the interest earned on these deposits will be fully-taxable. If
the interest rate on the loan is less than or equal to the refinance rate
of the Russian Federation Central Bank, then the earned interest is
taxed at 12%; if the interest rate on the loan is more than the
refinance rate, then the earned interest is taxed at 30%.' Second, in
order to ensure that banks cooperate with the taxation of interest,'
the draft code requires banks to report the opening or closing of a
taxpayer's account to the tax authorities using the taxpayer's
identification number, as well as to supply the tax authorities with
information about financial and other operations of a taxpayer who is
the subject of a tax examination.'s If a bank fails to report the
opening or closing of a taxpayer's account, it may incur a penalty of
300 times the minimum monthly wage.' This provision makes large-
230. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part I, supra note 205, arts. 269-93. See, e.g., id. art. 269
(stating that a violation of the registration requirement carries a monetary penalty of 100 times
the minimum monthly wage); id. art. 275 (stating that evasion of the obligation to file a tax
declaration carries a monetary penalty of 50% of the amount of tax due if overdue by 180 days
or less and 100% of the amount of tax due if overdue up to one year).
231. See id. arts. 251-265.
232. See Press Briefing by Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Shatalov, supra note 108.
233. The taxation of interest has been a thorny issue in the past due to the strong protest of
banks against the institution of such a practice. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
234. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part II, supra note 205, art. 204.
235. See id. art. 204, para. 2.
236. See iUJ art. 284.
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scale non-compliance extremely costly. Bank cooperation is essential
to the taxation of interest on personal savings accounts since the tax
authorities must rely on bank records to determine which taxpayers
possess accounts accruing interest which may be subject to taxation.
The draft code also taxes the gains realized from the sale of
stock, thereby rendering ineffective the use of stock options as
substitute wage payments. An employee who exercises his stock
options and immediately resells the stock at a significantly higher
price to his employer will be taxed on the difference between the sale
price and the purchase price of such stock.2" Because the employee
typically pays a minimal amount for the options and receives a much
larger sum from the stock sale, typically the equivalent of his salary,
the use of this tax-avoidance scheme probably will be curtailed.
Likewise, the draft code clearly discourages the use of insurance
payments in lieu of salary by taxing the employee on both the
insurance premium paid by his employer and the actual insurance
payment received if such payment exceeds the insurance premium by
a specified amount.' In short, the draft code contains provisions
which undermine the interest-free loan, stock-for-salary and
insurance-for salary schemes as methods of tax avoidance.
Several aspects of the draft code also may prevent the use of
other avoidance practices such as the non-reporting of income,' 9 cash
services payroll tax evasion, and capital flight. First, the more
transparent, comprehensible tax system" will permit the average
Russian taxpayer to determine when, where, and how to pay his taxes
and thus cause him to be less inclined to engage in not reporting
income or sending income abroad.
Second, the draft code sets forth strong, clearly-defined penalties
for non-compliance, but simultaneously protects against the arbitrary
use of such penalties. As previously discussed, the draft code
delineates twenty-four different tax crimes with corresponding
237. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part I, supra note 193, art. 101, para. 7; art. 103, para.
6(b).
238. See Draft of Personal Income Tax Provisions, supra note 171, art. 608, para. 6.
239. The draft tax code directly taxes both monetary wages and income received in-kind.
See id. art. 607, para. 1 (stating that "[t]he object of taxation shall be income earned by a
taxpayer in a tax period from sources in the Russian Federation and/or outside its borders"), id.
art. 608, para. I (stating that "[iln-kind income earned by a taxpayer in the form of goods
(work, services) shall be counted toward the taxpayer's income at the value of these goods
(work, services) on the day such income is received .... ").
240. See supra notes 191-208 and accompanying text.
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penalties. Under these provisions, the non-reporting of income, the
use of cash services payroll tax evasion, and the transport of capital
abroad may all be characterized as the failure to file a tax
declaration241 and/or tax evasion.242 Given that the failure to file a tax
declaration carries penalties ranging from 5% to 100% of tax due,243
and tax evasion results in a fine of up to three times the amount of
tax due,244 the new provisions serve as a strong deterrent against non-
compliance for those Russian citizens whose financial situations are
already precarious.
At the same time, the draft code deters the use of arbitrary
enforcement mechanisms and sanctions. For example, the draft code
provides the taxpayer with judicial recourse when he believes that his
tax burden has been unfairly assessed,4 or that he has been
incorrectly accused of violating the tax laws.24 The code also contains
a comprehensive list of circumstances which absolve the taxpayer
from liability 7 or "alleviate" his responsibility for the tax violation."
For example, an individual who negligently breaches a tax code
provision can be relieved of liability by informing the tax authorities
of the transgression,24 9 while an individual who commits a tax
violation due to grave personal or family circumstances most likely
will face a lesser sanction.' Thus, because these safeguards provide
Russian citizens with the assurance that they will not be prosecuted
unfairly or for inadvertent errors when attempting to comply with the
tax laws, these citizens may be more likely to comply voluntarily with
the new tax system and less likely to use avoidance practices such as
the non-reporting of income and the sending of capital abroad.
Finally, the draft code furnishes the tax authorities with wide
latitude to investigate taxpayers while preventing the arbitrary use of
241. See Russian Draft Tax Code Part I, supra note 205, arts. 274-75.
242. See id. art. 283.
243. See id. arts. 274-75.
244. See id art. 283.
245. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part MI, supra note 205, arts. 172, 236-38, 243-47; see also
supra notes 209-211 and accompanying text.
246. See id. art. 327 (listing rights of the individual charged with a tax violation); id. arts.
404-10 (establishing the right of appeal against the decision of the tax authority in the tax
violation case).
247. See id. art. 256.
248. See id. art. 257.
249. See id. art. 256, para. 3, art. 259, para. 2.
250. See id. art. 257, para. 1.
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this prerogative.51 For example, in connection with a tax inspection,
the tax authorities can enjoy unfettered access to the taxpayer's
business premises,"2 question any persons possessing relevant
information about the taxpayer, 3 and obtain all records regarding
bank accounts maintained in the taxpayer's name.24 However, tax
inspectors are not allowed free access into a taxpayer's residence,25
and will be subject to criminal proceedings if information gained
from a tax inspection which has been classified as a tax secret is
publicly disclosed.5 6  In addition, tax service personnel are
responsible for any damage caused to a taxpayer or his property
which results from improper action taken during a tax inspection, 7
or caused by other official conduct."8 Again, the combination of
"carrot and stick" policies in the enforcement area may motivate the
taxpayer to comply voluntarily with an apparently more objective
and fair system of taxation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In general, the draft code may eliminate several of the tax
avoidance methods that Russian citizens currently exploit. Although
the draft code likely will improve tax collection in Russia, several
aspects of implementing the code may be problematic. For example,
the actual enactment of the draft code probably will be a lengthy
process. Russia's Deputy Finance Minister has publicly stated that
tax reform will not occur until the year 1999,2" and even the head of
Russia's State Tax Service, Alexander Pochinok, admits that a new
251. In general, tax authorities have the right to verify information regarding income which
has been included on a tax return. See Draft of Personal Income Tax Provisions, supra note
171, art. 633.
252. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part II, supra note 205, art. 205, para. 3; see generally id.
art. 226 (rights of tax authorities).
253. See id. art 205, para. 3; see generally id. art. 226 (rights of tax authorities).
254. See iL art. 204; see generally id. art. 226 (rights of tax authorities). Unrelated to the
tax code but equally important to the exercise of tax inspections is the fact that the State Tax
Service should be receiving the largest portion of the 1997 budget among the civilian ministries.
See Peter Rutland, State Tax Service Ranks as Best Funded Agency Among Civilian Ministries,
14 TAX NOTES INT'L 1130, 1130 (1997).
255. See Draft Russian Tax Code Part I, supra note 205, art. 208, para. 3.
256. See id. art. 210.
257. See id. art. 211.
258. See iL art. 228.
259. See Tax Reforms to be Carried Out in Russia Not Earlier Than 1999, ITAR-TASS, Jan.
8, 1998, translated and available in LEXIS, News Library, Tass File.
[Vol. 8:135
TAX AVOIDANCE IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
tax system will be established in July 1998 at the earliest.'
The current draft will cost the Russian government
approximately 73 trillion rubles ($12.7 billion) per year in lost tax
revenues due to an overall decrease in the tax burden across all
levels.261  However, tax officials hope that a 20% increase in tax
collection 2 and the elimination of tax loopholes, which presently cost
the Russian government 170 trillion rubles per year in revenuem will
offset this loss. Furthermore, the draft code lacks transitional rules to
help guide taxpayers and tax inspectors through the potentially-
turbulent changeover from the old regime to the new. 4
Most importantly, although the draft tax code represents an
important step in the right direction, the draft fails to solve, and
perhaps should not be expected to solve, a fundamental characteristic
of Russian society which hinders tax collection. Namely, Russian
citizens are unaccustomed to voluntarily paying tax and are likely to
continue to avoiding payment until they receive concrete benefits
260. See Press Conference with State Tax Service Head Alexander Pochinok (Official
Kremlin International News Broadcast, Nov. 11, 1997), translated and available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curuws File. In the interim, the Ministry of Finance has submitted a package of
eleven tax bills to the Duma as a temporary replacement for the draft tax code. See Christian
Lowe, State Duma Puts Off Draft Budget Debate, Moscow TIMES, Nov. 14, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File. The Duma has recently approved one of the eleven
bills-this bill would reduce the income tax imposed on Russian citizens: the lowest tax
bracket (12%) would cover annual income up to 20 million rubles (opposed to the current level
of 12 million rubles) and the highest tax bracket (35%) would cover annual incomes over 100
million rubles (opposed to the current level of 48 million rubles). See Boris Aliabyev, Duma
Proposes Tax, Excise Increases, MOSCOW TIMES, Dec. 20, 1997. available in LEXIS, News
Library, Mostms File.
261. See Interview with Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Shatalov (Official Kremlin
International News Broadcast, June 16, 1997), translated and available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
262. See Press Briefing by Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Shatalov, supra note 108.
263. See Stephanie Baker-Said, Little Leeway in Tax Code, Author Says, MOSCOW TIMES,
May 23,1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
264. See Belinski, supra note 169. However, Alexander Pochinok, head of the State Tax
Service, has made public assurances that the State Tax Service will prepare supplementary
materials such as instructions and other aids to help familiarize the public with the draft code
once it is formally adopted. See Press Conference with State Tax Service Head Alexander
Pochinok, supra note 20.
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from doing so. Thus, until Russians experience an increase in their
standard of living which can be easily attributed to tax collection, the
culture of non-payment will not dissipate and full compliance with
any future tax regime cannot be expected.
Jennifer L. Franklin
